

KGB defectors eye pre-summit moves

By Ted Agres
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The Kremlin has formulated three scenarios for the Reagan-Gorbachev summit to take place next month and has activated its "active measures" and "disinformation" propaganda networks to prepare for the event, a group of analysts reports.

The overall objective, these experts say, is to "derail" the president's Strategic Defense Initiative. Moscow's strategy is to create a coalition in Western Europe and in the United States to isolate SDI proponents from other Western governments, opposition parties and business and labor groups here and abroad.

But even if the summit fails to derail SDI, "Soviet active measures specialists and their allies in the U.S. will be searching for a popular theme, slogan or tactic that can be employed in 1986 to increase anti-SDI pressure on the Congress and the administration," the experts write in a new report.

The first edition of the quarterly report, called the "Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation Forecast," was distributed this week. It is edited by Dr. Roy Godson, a Georgetown University professor of government. Three Soviet bloc defectors with first-hand experience in active measures and disinformation — Stanislav Levchenko, Ilya Dzhirkvelov and Ladislav Bitt-

man — are among the advisory board.

Together, the report states, they will analyze Soviet statements and publications, comb intelligence files as they become public and interview former Soviet bloc "practitioners" now living in the West. The aim is to "anticipate major Soviet active measures and disinformation campaigns directed against the United States and its allies."

The report defines active measures as Soviet use of "overt and covert techniques for influencing events and behavior in, and the actions of, foreign countries." Deception and distortion are hallmarks of active measures campaigns, and frequently, but not always, involve political activities.

The goal is to influence the policies of other governments without revealing the process. Toward this the Kremlin uses a variety of techniques, including forgeries, "agents of influence" and "front organizations" to promote Soviet objectives, and written and oral disinformation, the report explains.

Moscow spends about \$3 billion to \$4 billion annually to produce active measures campaigns that are "conceived, planned and systematically

executed by the centralized leadership ... as an integral part of Soviet efforts to support their foreign policy globally."

In preparation for the coming summit — and to derail U.S. SDI research — the Soviets are employing an active measures campaign to pressure West Germany, France, Italy, Japan and Canada not to support the U.S. initiative, the report states.

"By hinting at a trade-off of offensive forces for U.S. curtailment of SDI, Gorbachev is trying to influence the shape of the debate in the U.S., to split the Reagan administration, and weaken congressional support even for continuous research funding for the program, let alone authority for weapons development."

According to the report, some of the specific Soviet active measures themes include:

- The U.S. is developing a first-strike capability with SDI. This is destabilizing and will eliminate any remaining hope of improving U.S.-Soviet relations while dramatically increasing tension between the superpowers.

- SDI is dangerous because it will "provoke" the Soviets to develop "appropriate" countermeasures, forcing them to develop "revolutionary new" weapons systems.

- Moscow also will be forced to defend itself in the European theater by strengthening its nuclear forces

aimed against Western Europe.

- There will be no arms control agreements, only an exacerbation of tensions coupled with an intensification of the arms race with the potential for a nuclear holocaust.

- Moscow is willing to reach an agreement with the United States on

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The analysts assessed three possible outcomes for the Geneva summit and have structured responses appropriate to each. The "preferred outcome," the analysts note, would be for the type of "major and specific agreements" to emerge that they claim were achieved in the Nixon-Brezhnev meetings in 1972.

Here Mr. Gorbachev would seek a major agreement on weapons and arms control while trying to avoid discussion of human rights,

- Afghanistan and other regional problems. If confronted by Mr. Reagan, he will deal with the issues, but adopt the perspective that it is the United States that is the cause of major global problems.

The second Soviet scenario, considered less useful, would be modeled on the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna in 1961, where the leaders merely got acquainted but signed no formal document.

In this case, Mr. Gorbachev would make his own assessment of the president as well as seek to improve chances for bilateral travel and cultural agreements, interrupted by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and martial law in Poland. Moscow then would propose another meeting for further discussions while employing active measures to derail SDI and other priorities in 1986 and '87.

Should either of these scenarios occur, Mr. Gorbachev will be presented as a great statesman and domestic reformer who has been able to improve relations with the United States even at a time of great tension. This propaganda also will aid him at home as he is replacing many Communist Party leaders and preparing agendas.

A third possibility, considered remote at this point, is that Moscow will cancel the summit and blame the United States for endangering world peace.